Lessons from Brazilian President Lula’s First Trip to China
As I sifted through Chinese dailies at a newsstand in Beijing in late May 2004, I noticed that the front pages were all splashed with headlines about Brazilian president Lula’s visit to China. The media’s attention to this event seemed to echo the enthusiasm in the halls of the Brazilian embassy in Beijing prior to his arrival. Just a week earlier, a Brazilian diplomat had prophesied that the future historians would characterize this trip as a “watershed moment” in the relations between both countries. He made those comments while we were savoring Brazilian barbecue at a restaurant in downtown Beijing. Understandably, this diplomat might have been a bit too drunk on optimism; nevertheless, his words reflected the unforeseen deepening of Sino-Brazilian ties during that period.
When President Lula took office in early 2003, he looked at China, India, and South Africa as partners in his overly ambitious quest to rewrite the geography of global politics. He envisioned a multipolar world order with Brazil as a protagonist. At the same time, China’s voracious appetite for soybeans, iron ore, and other commodities quickly led to the strengthening of commercial ties with Brazil. Following his visit to Beijing in May 2004, Lula welcomed the then Chinese president Hu Jintao to Brasilia a few months later. While the repercussions of these trips continue to frame bilateral relations today, they led to challenges that Brazilian diplomats might not have anticipated twenty years ago. As Lula attempts to reset relations with China this week, he might find it worthwhile to take a look back at the unintended consequences brought about by his visit in May 2004.
REINVIGORATING BILATERAL RELATIONS
President Lula aimed at revitalizing Brazil’s ties with China during his first trip to the country. To understand the symbolism attached to this event, we need to take a step back to the early 1990s, when China sought a deeper political engagement with the developing world. The Chinese overtures to Brazil were a product of its diplomatic isolation following the 1989 Tiananmen Incident and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. As army tanks rolled into Tiananmen Square to crush student protests that year, the decade-long honeymoon period between China and the West also came to an end. Amid this environment, China turned its attention to Brazil and other developing nations.
China was a reliable geopolitical ally throughout the 1990s. Brazilians and Chinese both pursued a multilateral approach on the global stage based on similar principles: mutually beneficial cooperation, non-interference in domestic affairs, and respect for sovereignty. They pushed for a multipolar international system that would not be dominated exclusively by hegemonic powers. This geopolitical affinity and the establishment of a joint satellite program led the then Chinese vice-premier Zhu Rongji to describe Sino-Brazilian relations as a “strategic alliance” during a visit to Brasilia in 1990.
The idea that both countries shared a “strategic alliance” was, in reality, nothing more than wishful thinking. At the time, the focus of Brazilian diplomacy in East Asia had been Japan rather than China. Throughout the 1990s, with the exception of the joint satellite program and scattered commercial interests, stagnation characterized bilateral relations. Despite China’s rapid economic growth, Brazilian businessmen still showed little interest in investing in the country. In 1999, the then Chinese consul in Rio de Janeiro Chen Duqing (who would later be promoted to ambassador to Brazil) told me that most Brazilian businessmen “don’t seem to be taking China’s economic rise seriously.” He lamented that “the few who do have an interest in the Chinese market don’t have a long-term investment strategy.”
By the time Lula visited China in 2004, however, bilateral relations were undergoing a seismic shift. China had set its sights on Latin American commodities to fuel its economy, thereby boosting Brazil’s agribusiness sector. On the political front, Lula was determined to propel Brazil as a major player in international affairs and sought to build strategic ties with China, Russia, South Africa, and India. Brazil also coveted a permanent seat in the United Nations (UN) Security Council, along with Germany, Japan, and India. Brazilian diplomats were confident that they would be able to secure China’s support. These officials argued that Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council would serve China’s interests, as both countries shared similar geopolitical pursuits. The problem, as Lula would realize during his meeting with Chinese leader Hu Jintao, was that commercial interests had replaced geopolitical considerations as the main driving force behind Sino-Brazilian relations for China.
A WEAKENED GEOPOLITICAL ALLY
While President Lula arrived in Beijing to much fanfare in 2004, a closed-door meeting between the Brazilian and Chinese leaders foreshadowed the thorny political disagreements that would cause diplomatic headaches. Hu Jintao maneuvered around Brazil’s insistence that he publicly support the UN Security Council reform. The Chinese leader privately explained that his country would not stand in the way of Brazil’s aspirations to gaining a permanent seat. He also noted, to the dismay of his guests, that China preferred to refrain from voicing such support publicly to avoid upsetting other Latin American countries such as Argentina and Mexico.
Hu Jintao’s cautious approach to the UN Security Council reform surprised many Brazilian diplomats and dissipated the long-standing mirage that both countries shared a similar stance on multilateralism and the “democratization” of the world order. China’s ambivalent statements on the matter irked Brazilian representatives in Beijing. Although China publicly embraced a greater engagement with developing countries in the UN Security Council, behind the scenes its diplomats had already begun to quietly undermine its reform.
The disagreements between both countries over the UN Security Council reform shed light on wider problems that have plagued their relations since that period. Brazilian diplomacy failed to fully grasp the shifts in Beijing’s geopolitical strategies between the late 1990s and early 2000s. As China became a global economic and political powerhouse, the country gradually buried its identity as a developing country. Instead, it sought to be accepted as an influential player in the post-Cold War international system. In this regard, Chinese policymakers recast Brazil and Latin America as an arena of strategic competition with the U.S. and the European Union. Even though China continues to seduce leaders such as Lula with narratives of “mutually beneficial” cooperation among nations of the global south, Beijing’s approach to Latin America has changed. Unlike the 1990s, China now considers Brazil less of a geopolitical ally and more of a supplier of raw materials and an outlet for its manufactured products.
When Lula returned to Beijing in 2009, China had already leapt ahead of the U.S. and Argentina to become Brazil’s largest trading partner. The momentum that propelled bilateral ties throughout the first decade of this century, however, created trade and political relationships that many Brazilian businessmen and diplomats described as lopsided in China’s favor. Imports of Chinese manufactured products to Brazil quintupled between 2005 and 2010. An anti-China business lobby emerged, stemming from concerns about the detrimental effects of the flood of Chinese imports on the Brazilian textile industry and toy manufacturers. Former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who governed the country between 1995–2003, didn’t mince his criticism of Lula’s approach to China. In a candid assessment of the challenges plaguing bilateral ties, Cardoso underscored that “Brazil has been naïve in its management of the China relationship. It is far more uneven than people think.” The need to craft a more effective strategy to deal with Beijing was even acknowledged by Celso Amorim, the chancellor during Lula’s first two terms. “We need to rethink our relationship with China,” Amorim told a leading Brazilian newspaper in 2010.
WHAT LIES AHEAD
Since last year’s presidential campaign, Lula has signaled his intention to distance himself from the confrontational approach to bilateral relations adopted by Jair Bolsonaro, who governed Brazil from 2019 until early this year. Bolsonaro, mimicking his “idol” Donald Trump, demonized Beijing with his virulent anti-China hysteria and conspiracy theories. Eager to turn the page, Lula will attempt to mend the political ties and boost trade during his visit to China. His administration’s desire to play a prominent role in international affairs will also be on display. In his meeting with Chinese leaders this Friday, Lula will discuss climate change and his much-criticized proposals to mediate an end to the conflict in the Ukraine. We cannot help but wonder whether Lula is attempting to achieve unrealistic goals during this short trip.
Recasting Brazil’s relationship with China could end up being far more challenging than Lula might expect. While the turbulence that characterized the bilateral ties during the Bolsonaro years might be in the rearview mirror, dealing with China has always been a herculean task for the Brazilian diplomacy. The frustrated efforts to obtain Chinese support for Brazil’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council in 2004–05 should be viewed as one of various instances that illustrate this point. If Lula truly wishes to reset Sino-Brazilian relations, he must understand that China can neither be seen as a panacea nor a scapegoat for Brazil’s own domestic and international woes.
